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IMAGINATION IS WHERE THE ACTION IS*
Two forms of pretending, if properly understood, put a strainon prevalent views about human imagination in philosophyand cognitive science. If we recast our image of imagination,
we can accommodate them. The two phenomena I wish to introduce
are semi-pretense and pretense layering.
(For clarity, I always use “pretend” and cognates to refer to bodily be-
havior; “imagine” and cognates refer to mental activity and structures.)
Semi-pretense : Jennifer and Leroy are at a pool on a summer day,
watching other children jump off the high-dive. One clumsy child
almost trips off the end of the board and falls into the water at an
awkward angle with arms waving. “Two,” says Leroy, holding up two
fingers with a frown. “I give him a one,” says Jennifer, holding up a
finger. Next a young woman springs off the board, glides in a swan
dive, and enters the water with hardly a splash. “Ten,” they both shout,
holding up ten fingers each.
Are Jennifer and Leroy pretending to be judges at a diving competition,
or are they acting plainly, simply evaluating the dives for themselves?
The question excludes a middle answer. There is a continuum of
cases. At one end (full pretense) Jennifer and Leroy wear polo shirts,
speak in officious tones, and hold up placards with numbers. At the
other end (plain action), the two just say things like, “that dive was
pretty good,” with no trappings of a diving judge. The example
described is in between, so it is semi-pretense. (If it seems like plain
action to you, just move one step over on the continuum.)
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Pretense layering : In the film “Rebel Without a Cause,” James Dean
and Natalie Wood play (pretend to be) high school students, Jim and
Judy, who begin dating. One scene is in a deserted mansion, where
their two characters pretend to be married adults who consider buying
a house. “Should we rent or are we in a buying mood, dear?” “You
decide, darling. Remember our budget.” Thus, there was more than
one layer: Dean and Wood pretended to be high school students who
pretend to be adults. In principle, such pretense layering can go on for arbi-
trarily many layers; in practice, there are rarely more than two or three.1
These phenomena give theorists a clear directive: identify the
imaginative structures responsible for them and other forms of
pretense. I take up that directive. To advance our understanding of
imagination and pretense, I defend this thesis:
Active Imagination Thesis: There exists a form of imagining that is a con-
tinuously updated forward model of action in the world, in which action
possibilities are constructed in relation to a manifold of largely per-
ceptual representations that can be veridical, nonveridical, or mixed—
where mixed is a usual and important case.
A “forwardmodel” is an internal representation ofmotor commands that
anticipates the consequences of those commands on bodily motion. The
“nonveridical” perceptual representations are basically mental imagery. I
specify “nonveridical” because some mental imagery is veridical, for
example, an accurate visual memory.2 What is radical about this view, in
relation to other views I consider, is the idea that (nonveridical) mental
imagery can be integrated into the perceptual field and that this form
of imagining delivers the objects we relate to in constructing pretense
action, such as make-believe.3 My defense of this thesis has three sides.
(1) Competing theories fail to account for important mental and be-
havioral phenomena, such as semi-pretense and layering. They have
other problems, as well.
(2) The theory of imagination I offer accounts for the behavioral phe-
nomena of semi-pretense and layering, as well as other phenomena.
(3) The theory of imagination I offer coheres with empirical findings
in cognitive neuroscience.
1Herb Clark introduces the term “layering” in chapter 12 of Using Language (New
York: Cambridge, 1996) pp. 353–86. Clark is inspired by Erving Goffman, as am I; see
Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Boston: Northeastern,
1986). For philosophical discussion of layering, see Kendall Walton’s Mimesis as Make-
Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts (Cambridge: Harvard, 1990).
2 “Veridical” basically means treated as accurate by the agent’s cognitive system. How to flesh
out that idea further is an issue I take up in my (unpublished) “What Is a Judgment?”
3 My theory is radical in relation to some academic views. But the phenomena were at
some level familiar all along. I focus here on pretense for play, but my theory extends
also to pretense for deception.
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My view of imagination—if it is correct—has implications beyond
pretense. In the course of this paper, I suggest various ways in which
imagination is central to producing action generally.4
Sections i and ii are critical, displaying the inadequacy of two cur-
rent theories: (i) the Nichols and Stich theory, which I call the con-
ditional belief account, and (ii) what I call the replacement account,
advocated in somewhat different forms by Velleman, Currie and
Ravenscroft, and Doggett and Egan.5 But the critiques of these com-
petitors lead to constructive suggestions. And section iii presents
my positive theory: the integrated imagination theory. I call it this to
emphasize that the structure of representations that leads to pre-
tense (and other) action integrates imagining and veridical represen-
tation in a variety of ways. Section iv summarizes the implications of
my theory for mind and action.
i. the conditional belief account
Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich augment the standard desire-belief
explanation of action with the “Possible World Box” (PWB), which is
meant to house imaginings. The desire-belief explanation of action is
that desires and beliefs jointly cause and rationalize actions that will
make the contents of the desires true, if the contents of the beliefs
are true.6 (For example: desiring to find a cup of coffee, I go to where
I believe the coffee shop is.) How, for Nichols and Stich, does the
PWB augment the standard desire-belief explanation of action?
…as a possible world description is unfolding in the PWB, the pretender
comes to have beliefs of the form:
If it were the case that p, then it would (or might) be the case that
q1 & q2 & … & qn
where p is the pretence premiss and q1 & q2&… & qn are the representa-
tions in the PWB. These beliefs, along with the desire to behave in a way
4 Some of what I say may seem to depend on the assumption that Andy Clark criti-
cizes, namely, the assumption of “experience-based control” (in “Visual Experience
and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight?” Philosophical Review, cx, 4 (October 2001):
495–519. So I wish to caution the reader that not all forms of imagining I posit are
necessarily part of conscious experience, although surely some are. Sorting out which are
conscious must be postponed until after the theory is stated in representationalist terms.
5 All references to these authors refer to: Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, Mind-
reading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds
(New York: Oxford, 2003); J. David Velleman, “On the Aim of Belief,” in The Possibility
of Practical Reason (New York: Oxford, 2000), pp. 244–81; Gregory Currie and Ian
Ravenscroft, Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology (New York: Oxford,
2002); and Tyler Doggett and Andy Egan, “Wanting Things You Don’t Want: The Case
for an Imaginative Analogue of Desires,” Philosopher’s Imprint, vii, 9 (December 2007): 1–17.
6 Donald Davidson revived this explanation form in his “Actions, Reasons, and
Causes,” this journal, lv, 23 (November 7, 1963): 685–700.
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that is similar to the way one would behave if p were the case, lead to the
pretence behaviour… .7
In short, what one imagines generates conditional beliefs, and pre-
tense occurs when one desires to behave as if the antecedent of the
conditional belief were true.
Here is how their theory would explain pretending to be a thief. The
pretense premise represented in my PWB is I am a thief. That premise is
elaborated upon in the PWB by various processes, which results in repre-
sentations with contents such as I carry a gun into a bank and point it at the
teller. What goes on in the PWB then causes me, the imaginer, to have a
conditional belief of the form if I were a thief, I would carry a gun into a bank
and point it at the teller. Then the bodily pretense, such as making a gun
shape with my hand and saying “Stick ‘em up!” is caused by the condi-
tional belief and a desire to behave as if the antecedent of the conditional
were true. The desire’s content would be that I behave as if I were a thief.
Importantly, what one imagines on this theory does not have a
direct role in causing action. Rather, the effect of imagining on action
is mediated by beliefs. The diagram, or “boxology,” that Nichols and
Stich offer exhibits this mediation:8
7 Nichols and Stich, op. cit., pp. 37–38.
8 Ibid., p. 36.
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There is no direct arrow from the PWB (on the left) to the Decision-
making system (center). Rather one’s imaginings only influence action
when mediated by conditional beliefs. That is why I call this the condi-
tional belief account. Let me put the point about mediation as starkly as
I can: on the Nichols and Stich theory, the pretender’s bodily actions
would be exactly the same, even if she had no imaginings, as long as
the relevant conditional beliefs were still in place.
There are three major shortcomings of this theory. First, it cannot
without absurd consequences explain pretense of outlandish behaviors.
Second, the claims of the theory devolve into incoherence if one tries to
use it to explain pretense layering. Third, the theory cannot make sense
of the fact that people can choose pretense behaviors from a variety of
options they think up. These points are not merely negative, however,
since understanding them gives rise to constructive suggestions for a
better theory of imagining.
Criticism 1 (outlandish pretense) : I once saw a comedic improvisation
in which two actors, supposed to be in a duel, spontaneously pre-
tended to mount pterodactyls and begin jousting with one another.9
According to the conditional belief account, explaining this pretense
requires positing the following in the Belief Box of either improviser:
if I were in a duel, I would mount a pterodactyl and joust. But this posit
is absurd. No one believes such a thing. So the conditional belief
account falters at explaining pretense of outlandish behavior. Nor is
this an isolated example. A student who gets a bad grade on her test
may, in private, pretend she is shooting the professor with a gun:
“Bang, take that!” What would her conditional belief be? Presumably:
if I had a gun, I would shoot my professor. But surely it is not a require-
ment that she believe this in order to engage in such pretending. In
fact, it is perfectly common for people to pretend to do things that
they do not believe they would do under any circumstances. Some-
times that is the point.10
Criticism 2 (layering): Often in pretense layering, the assumption
about who or what one is in one layer is inconsistent (or at least
incoherent) with the assumption about who or what one is in the
second layer. This can be seen to some extent in the example of James
Dean, who is a high school student in one layer and a married adult
in another layer. But examples can be starker. Suppose I pretend to be
a child who pretends to be a dinosaur on the hunt. What would the
9 The group was Stanford Improvisers, otherwise known as SImps.
10 Criticism of the Nichols and Stich view along these lines also appears in Doggett
and Egan, op. cit.
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conditional belief be in such pretense? Presumably something like: if I
were a child, then (if I were a dinosaur, I would hunt). But there is no way
to make sense of this belief, since the two antecedents do not cohere at
all. If someone claimed to believe that, I would not even understand
the claim. Thus, the conditional belief account makes incoherent
posits when applied to pretense layering.11
Criticism 3 (choice): Sometimes pretend play is utterly spontaneous,
but sometimes we choose to pretend and, while pretending, choose
between a number of different actions we can perform. In pretending
to be a doctor, for example, I can choose between pretending to
refuse to perform a surgery and pretending to perform the surgery.
How is the conditional belief account to explain the possibility of this
sort of choice? Presumably, the pretense premise in the PWB is I am a
doctor. Then both further contents in the PWB must be represented: I
perform the surgery and I refuse to perform the surgery. At this point, Nichols
and Stich must say that I come to have a conditional belief with one of
these contents represented in the consequent (whichever it is I actu-
ally do). If I end up choosing to pretend to perform the surgery, it
must have been because I had the conditional belief if I were a doctor,
I would perform the surgery; if I end up choosing to pretend not to, it
must have been because I had the belief if I were a doctor, I would refuse
to perform the surgery. But that gets it wrong. When I choose among pre-
tense actions, I do not thereby force one or the other of two condi-
tional beliefs on myself. First, that contradicts the very persuasive
idea that coming to have beliefs is not a matter of choice.12 Second,
it involves a superfluous and unlikely posit: a belief in something
without any evidence whatsoever, the contrary of which could just
as well have (by choice!) been believed.
* * *
All three criticisms show that the conditional belief account is forced
to posit bizarre, incoherent, or simply unlikely beliefs in order to
explain ordinary pretense. The account was forced into this position
11 It is tempting to say that Nichols and Stich can appeal here to the concept of
PRETEND (if I were a child, I would PRETEND to be a hunting dinosaur). But Nichols
and Stich disavow appeal to the concept of PRETEND shortly after the quoted pas-
sage, since they oppose the way that Alan Leslie invokes that concept. For a snapshot
of the debate, see Ori Friedman and Leslie, “The Conceptual Underpinnings of Pre-
tense: Pretending Is Not ‘Behaving-As-If ’,” Cognition, cv, 1 (October 2007): 103–24.
Also, Stich (personal communication) holds that the passage I quote is meant as a
general account of pretense.
12 The locus classicus of this view is Bernard Williams, “Deciding to Believe,” in Problems
of the Self (New York: Cambridge, 2007), pp. 136–51.
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because it posits the Belief Box in between the PWB and the sys-
tems that produce behavior. Thus, it is probably a mistake to posit
an architecture in which beliefs causally mediate the influence of
imagining on pretense action, where this means that imaginings
influence behavior only by influencing beliefs. The constructive sug-
gestion, therefore, is that imagining produces pretense directly,
without needing the mediation of belief.
It is, of course, undeniable that beliefs in some way influence how
and what we pretend. My belief that doctors perform surgery, for
example, in part caused me to imagine doing or refusing surgery
when I pretended to be a doctor. This shows that beliefs do have a
role in imagining and pretense, but Nichols and Stich got it the wrong
way around. They said that the contents of imagining bring about
conditional beliefs, which then cause pretense behavior. I invert that:
beliefs have influence on what one imagines; then imagining pri-
marily influences what one pretends. Furthermore, I think one’s
beliefs and other cognitive attitudes (as well as conative attitudes) com-
ment on and constrain what one actively imagines.13 Beliefs may even
have veto power over imagination’s ability to yield pretense or other
behaviors, but beliefs do not stand between imagining and action.
ii. the replacement account
What I call the replacement account does hold that imagining has an
unmediated role in generating pretend play. This account modifies
the standard belief-desire explanation of action in a different way
from the conditional belief account, which made imagining a source
of (conditional) beliefs. On the replacement account, imaginings take
two forms—one form corresponding to beliefs and one to desires—
and they effectively replace beliefs and desires in producing action.
Serious action, then, is the action motivated by beliefs and desires;
pretense is motivated by replacement beliefs and replacement desires. To
talk about these theoretical posits concisely, I extend the Doggett
and Egan terminology by calling imaginative replacement beliefs
“i-beliefs” and replacement desires “i-desires.” (Doggett and Egan
only write of “i-desires” and simply use “imagination” for the posit
I call “i-belief.”14)
13 I use “cognitive attitude” and “conative attitude” in their usual senses. A cognitive
attitude is an attitude that represents the world or some portion of it as being a certain
way; beliefs, hypotheses, assumptions for the sake of argument, and the like are all
cognitive attitudes. Conative attitudes, such as desires and wishes, represent the world
as to be made a certain way. (This formulation borrows from Nishi Shah and Velleman,
“Doxastic Deliberation,” Philosophical Review , cxiv, 4 (October 2005): 495–519.)
14 Amy Kind independently hit upon using “i-belief ” in discussing this family of views.
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Doggett’s and Egan’s diagram clarifies the replacement account’s
structure.15
The Imagination Box (i-beliefs) and I-Desire Box do what the Belief
and Desire Boxes do, except when the former boxes do it it counts
as pretense, whereas when the latter boxes do it it counts as serious
action. If Sally asks Grammy for ice cream while wanting ice cream
and believing she can get it by asking Grammy, that is serious action.
If Sally says a “magic” spell, i-desiring to fly to a magic kingdom and
i-believing she can get there through the spell, that is pretense. (This
characterization raises the question of what the difference is supposed
to be between imagining and belief, a question which I think no
replacement theorist answers satisfactorily. But since that is not what
is at issue in this paper, I will not pursue that criticism here.16)
In addition to Doggett’s and Egan’s paper, the replacement ac-
count can be found in Velleman and in Currie and Ravenscroft. What
are their motivations?
Velleman is motivated to understand what distinguishes belief from
imagining, and finds by considering examples that this is a difficult
problem. The reason is that “imaginings” seem to him to motivate
behavior in relation to “wishes” in the same way that beliefs motivate
in relation to desires. To give one of Velleman’s examples, imagining
she is an elephant and wishing to take a drink, a child is motivated to
pretend to drink from a “pail” (where a chair is the prop for the pail)
15 Doggett and Egan, op. cit., p. 4.
16 I take up that issue in “The Motivational Role of Belief,” Philosophical Papers,
xxxviii, 2 ( July 2009): 219–46.
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with her “trunk” (arm). Thus, for Velleman, examples show that
imaginings (i-beliefs) and wishes (i-desires) can replace beliefs and
desires in motivating action.
Currie and Ravenscroft use the terms “belief-like imagining” and
“desire-like imagining.” Their motivation is simulation theory, which
is a theory about how people understand decisions and predict the
behavior of others. In short, simulation theory says we understand
the minds of others by running our own belief, desire, and other
mental machinery “offline.” So for Currie and Ravenscroft, the theo-
retical posits of belief-like imagining and desire-like imagining origi-
nated as concepts of “offline” states that people use in understanding
the minds of others. Their thought about pretense seems to be that,
since they are positing such states already, it would be nice to use
them for something else as well, such as explaining pretense.17
Doggett and Egan are motivated by two things. First, they see the
Nichols and Stich architecture as insufficient (for many of the same
reasons that I do). Second, they think positing i-desires is parsi-
monious insofar as they can do double duty: explain pretend behavior
and explain the emotions people have in response to imagining, espe-
cially in relation to fictional drama. If desires can explain emotion,
so can i-desires. On this second point, Currie and Ravenscroft and
Velleman seem to be in agreement.
There are, in sum, three points common to the replacement ac-
counts of pretense:
(1) i-beliefs and i-desires are propositional attitudes.
(2) i-beliefs and i-desires influence action generation in the manner of
beliefs and desires.
(3) i-beliefs and i-desires influence emotion in the manner of beliefs
and desires.
The motivations for the replacement view amount to examples, a pre-
existing theory (simulation theory), and apparent parsimony.
This account seems even more intuitively compelling than the
conditional belief account. But it fails just as badly. First, as with the
conditional belief account, the replacement account cannot explain
layering. Second, due to the binary nature of the architecture posited,
the replacement account cannot account for the continuity we see in
forms of pretense; that is, it cannot account for semi-pretense. Third,
the theoretical commitments that replacement theorists put on their
17 To be fair, Currie and Ravenscroft discuss four different ways pretense could be
motivated. All of them, however, are modifications of desire-belief psychology, so they
do not incorporate the points about pretense I develop in section iii.
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posits, i-beliefs and i-desires, conflict in an important class of cases.
But, as before, understanding how this account fails leads to construc-
tive suggestions about how to structure a better theory of imagining
and pretense.
Criticism 1 (layering) : Let us return to “Rebel Without a Cause,” in
which Dean’s and Wood’s high school student characters pretend
to be adults who consider buying a house. The replacement account
posits in Dean an i-desire to escape (as Jim) with Judy and an i-belief
that by entering a deserted mansion he can do this. That explains the
first layer of pretending to be Jim in the mansion. But what i-belief/
i-desire pair causes the behavior of saying, “Should we rent or are we
in a buying mood, dear?” Dean performs that action in the character
of an adult, not as high school Jim. The problem with the replacement
account is that it has no resource to explain the second-layer pretense
actions, since the i-beliefs and i-desires are dedicated to the first-layer
actions. Furthermore, the i-beliefs and i-desires cannot represent
both layers, since that would result in incoherent i-beliefs, which will
not explain anything.
We can put this criticism as a dilemma. Either (i) i-beliefs and
i-desires explain the first “Jim” layer of pretense, or (ii) they explain
the second “adult” layer. If (i), then the second layer is mysterious. If
(ii), then this is no longer a case of pretense layering, but a case of
pretense changing; under (ii), there will no longer be any sense in
which Dean keeps pretending to be the high school student while
pretending to be the adult.18 There is no layering.
Criticism 2 (binarity versus semi-pretense): If beliefs and desires explain
plain action, and if i-beliefs and i-desires explain pretense, what ex-
plains semi-pretense? As noted, there is a continuum between full
pretense and plain action. But the replacement account is binary;
there are only two pairs of boxes, which suggests that the plain action/
pretense distinction should also be binary. But it is not. Jennifer holds
up ten fingers in response to the swan dive. Do we say that she desired
to indicate her approval and believed that holding up ten fingers
would indicate approval? Or do we say that she i-desired (qua judge)
to give the highest score and i-believed that ten was the highest score?
The first option leaves the similarity of Jennifer’s action to judging
behavior unexplained. The second leaves unexplained the difference
between what she does and what she would do in full pretense, where
she pretends to hold up a placard and speaks in more officious tones.
18 The replacement theorists could posit i-i-beliefs and i-i-desires, but this would only
add another pair of boxes that looks just like the other pairs, with only the theorist’s labels
to distinguish them; there would be no sense in which the idea of layering is preserved.
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The replacement account has to treat plain action and pretense
as binary. Its only resort, then, is to say that semi-pretense is not a truly
distinct phenomenon. It is an illusion that stems from the fact that
plain action can be playful and pretense can be done more or less
seriously. Whether that claim is true depends ultimately on the under-
lying architecture of imagination. Is it binary or not, and if so, in what
ways? But even if the response is true—I think it is not—the replace-
ment account leaves manner unexplained. Why is some plain or
“serious” action playful, having pretend-like qualities? Does imagina-
tion have nothing to do with this?
Criticism 3 (conflicting theoretical demands): Doggett and Egan and
Currie and Ravenscroft explicitly state that i-desires explain emotional
reaction to what is imagined (i-believed), where what is imagined can
have fiction, such as novels and films, as its source. Why do I feel angry
at Iago? The replacement theorist says it is because I i-believe his
deceit will cause catastrophe and i-desire Desdemona and Othello
to have a happy life. The general principle seems to be that i-desiring
that p yields negative emotions in conjunction with i-beliefs that
∼p (or that ∼p is likely) and positive emotions in conjunction with
i-beliefs that p (or that p is likely).
The problem of conflicting theoretical demands comes when
people pretend to do things that run contrary to the emotions that a
given imagining engenders. Limburger cheese, for example, may be
so repulsive to me that imagining eating it engenders disgust. Neverthe-
less, I can pretend to eat an imaginary plate of Limburger, even as I
feel disgust about what I am pretending. For such a case, the replace-
ment theorist has to posit an i-desire to eat the Limburger (to explain the
pretense behavior) and an i-desire not to eat Limburger ever (to explain
the disgust). The general problem is this: whenever someone pretends
an action contrary to her emotional inclinations about what she is
pretending, the replacement account has to posit conflicting i-desires—
an i-desire to explain the pretense and a conflicting i-desire to explain
the emotion. This raises a puzzling question. Why doesn’t the i-desire
to eat Limburger generate the emotion and the i-desire never to eat
Limburger generate the pretense action? In that case, I would feel
excitement about the imaginary Limburger in front of me but pretend
not to eat it, which is the opposite of what I did. More generally, when
there are two conflicting i-desires, which one gets to generate the
pretense action, and which one gets to generate the emotion? The
replacement account as it stands has no answer to this question, so
it needs elaboration. Thus, replacement theorists cannot claim parsi-
mony in positing i-desires as quickly as they thought. Worse yet, the
replacement account says that i-desires generate pretense action and
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emotion, but we have seen that for some cases it will have to say
(without explanation so far) that sometimes they do not generate
action and sometimes they do not generate emotion. That seems
to conflict.19
* * *
What constructive suggestions can we glean from these criticisms?
The replacement account falters because it separates the veridical
boxes sharply from the nonveridical boxes. We can remedy this by
saying that imaginative representations can integrate with veridical
representations. If integration were to happen at the higher cognitive
level, the level of belief, the subject would become confused, like a
schizophrenic. But it may be that integrating veridical and imaginary
representations is possible at the level of perceptual and motor repre-
sentation. We know from Stephen Kosslyn’s long research program—
not to mention just doing phenomenology—that there are indeed
perceptually formatted imaginary representations, or mental images.
The integration of those imaginings with veridical perceptions—
allowing imagery seamlessly to take the roles of percepts—may alle-
viate the problems caused by the binary replacement picture. This
view would require moving the imaginings most immediate to the
causation of pretense away from the category of propositional atti-
tude and into the category of perceptual imagery (and, I argue, motor
imagery). But that is for the best, if we are to explain the emotions gen-
erated in response to imagining, which are a further problem for the
replacement account in any case. There is reason to think that imag-
ining in, say, visual or auditory detail has far greater emotional impact
than bare, propositional imagining. But that does not mean we
should write propositional attitudes out of the story. Rather, as sug-
gested, cognitive and conative (propositional) attitudes help cause
perceptually formatted (or other spatially rich) imaginings, but those
imaginings are most immediate to the production of both pretense
action and emotion. At the same time, cognitive and conative atti-
tudes that comment on the rich imaginings keep track of which layer of
pretense a rich imagining represents. And, to preview further, semi-
pretense could be what happens when spatially rich imaginings influ-
ence behavior without the sustaining, reflective involvement from higher
cognitive and conative attitudes.
I turn now to clarifying what forms of integration are relevant to
these claims; that is, I now give my positive theory.
19 For similar criticisms, see Eric Funkhouser and Shannon Spaulding, “Imagination
and Other Scripts,” Philosophical Studies, cxliii, 3 (March 2009): 291–314.
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iii. the integrated imagination theory
Let us turn the constructive suggestions into formal claims and apply
them to reveal how imagination is involved in producing action.
Claim 1: Imagining influences pretense behavior without the mediation
of belief.
Claim 2: Cognitive and conative attitudes, like beliefs and desires, help
cause what one imagines.
Claim 3: Cognitive and conative attitudes comment on and constrain
imaginings and how they influence pretense.
Claim 4: The imaginings that are most immediate to the production of
pretense are spatially rich; they are perceptually formatted or
structured as representations of bodily movement.
Claim 5: Perceptually formatted imaginings can be integrated with veridi-
cal perception, especially visual or auditory perception.20
Claim 6: Imagining arouses emotions largely in the same way that per-
ception does, as imaginings play out on perceptual cortices
that feed into the brain’s emotional centers.21
Let me clarify some points.
Claim 1 does not entail that beliefs have no role in causing imag-
inings or in generating pretense; rather, when it comes to generating
pretense actions (and other actions), imaginings of the type I posit
are closer to the generation of action insofar as they are causally
downstream from beliefs. That is the point Claim 2 emphasizes.
Claim 3 attributes more roles to beliefs and desires (or other atti-
tudes) in the production of pretense than simply causing imaginings.
Beliefs and desires can be about what one imagines and can comment
on the value to the agent of a particular imagined action. This is
important to explaining how choice among multiple imagined pos-
sibilities happens. One can imagine doing an action and then believe
that doing that would be good, where the imagining gives content to
the belief.22 The comments on imaginings by beliefs and desires about
20Most of my examples are visual, but the claim holds for audition, like imagining a
voice in the wind.
21 Tamar Gendler discusses emotional response to imagining under the heading
“contagion” in “Imaginary Contagion,” Metaphilosophy, xxxvii, 2 (April 2006): 1–21.
The term is “contagion” because imagining seems to infiltrate the role normally occu-
pied by belief. But I object to the term “contagion” because I think emotive responses
to imagining are a feature, not a bug. They may be problematic sometimes, but they do
more good than harm, since they give orientation with respect to the imagined future.
22 John Perry gives an interpretation of David Kaplan according to which demon-
strative constituents of representations (for example, that) have their contents partly
determined by a “directing intention,” which in turn connects to the world in many
cases via perception. See Perry, “Directing Intentions,” in Joseph Almog and Paolo
Leonardi, eds., The Philosophy of David Kaplan (New York: Oxford, 2009), pp. 187–201.
imagination 67
the value of an imagined action then constrain what further actions
and events one imagines.
A helpful analogy comes from the history of geometry. Prior to
Descartes’ invention of the Cartesian plane, geometric proofs re-
quired diagrams. Yet proofs were accompanied by comments in the
margins that indicated which properties of the diagram were relevant
to the proof. The imagining I posit in this paper is analogous to the
spatial diagrams—and the drawing of them—while beliefs, desires,
and propositional imaginings are analogous to the comments. Fur-
thermore, consider what went on in the geometer’s mind when read-
ing such proofs. There was spatial perception of the diagram, but there
were also beliefs about the diagram, caused by the marginal com-
ments. But the beliefs had their contents tied to the diagram through
relating to the percepts; there is no other way for beliefs about the
diagram to be had. Now consider the mind of the geometer who,
with eyes closed, remembers a proof from before and knows what theo-
rem it proves. This is a clear case of perceptual imagining with higher
beliefs commenting on the perceptual imagining. I take this example
to be an independent existence proof of the sort of mental structures
to which I appeal in explaining pretense: spatially rich imagining with
comment and constraint by higher attitudes.
Claim 4 appeals to the traditional idea of mental imagery but
also emphasizes that anticipatory motor plans, or forward models, can
be imaginative.23 That means one can construct an action in one’s
mind as an imagining without committing to its ever happening; this
is a motor plan in potential. A basketball player who imagines her
free-throw motion from a first-person perspective prior to taking
the shot is imaginatively constructing such a forward model.24
Claim 5 is the most radical departure from the two theories just
considered, which had imagining separated off in distinct boxes.25
Claim 5 allows for mental images to be integrated with the perceptual
field. Try an experiment. Is there an empty chair near you? If so, look
Perry’s focus is language, but the point can be extended to mental representation. I say
here that a visual (or other sensori-form) imagining can take the place of perception in
giving content to a demonstrative constituent of belief or propositional imagining.
23 This idea of motor imagining is present in Currie and Ravenscroft, op. cit., as is
mental imagery. But they do not incorporate these notions into what they say about
the production of pretense.
24 Thanks to Juli Huddleston for this example. She also gave me the example of the
pole-vaulter who visualizes her vault from start to finish from the first-person perspec-
tive before competing.
25 Boxologists may respond that the “boxes” are just metaphors. But the metaphor
is misleading.
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at it, and imagine Santa Claus sitting in that chair. Is your mental
image of Santa Claus in a separate box from your other perceptions?
Or is it integrated with the perceptual manifold before you? If you
think the latter, you tend toward my view. The projected geometry
of the imaginary Santa Claus is in the same represented space as
the perceived chair and is represented as bearing rich spatial rela-
tions to it—much richer than the simple <on the chair> of which
propositional imagining is capable. Such integrated imaginings are
central to the production of pretense.26
Claim 6 is fairly clear: whatever the pathways are by which percep-
tion excites emotion, those are the pathways by which imagining ex-
cites emotion. But again, that does not mean that higher cognitive
and conative attitudes are otiose. If you visually imagine a cousin of
yours, part of what makes it possible for this to be an imagining about
your cousin are beliefs you have about your cousin: what he looks
like, what his manners are, and so on. Thus, insofar as the identity
of individuals in your imaginings makes a difference to how those
imaginings make you feel, higher cognitive attitudes make a differ-
ence as well. Still, the road from belief to emotion goes through
imagination—at least in imaginative fiction and pretense.27
Now I turn to an illustration.
I was jogging down the street in Medford one day, when I suddenly
saw a skunk in front of me. Naturally, I did not want to get sprayed. So
I visualized the skunk spraying, imagined myself running across the
26 Of course, not all images are so integrated, since one can close one’s eyes and
imagine. But many are.
27My view here pushes against Kendall Walton’s view of fear. He holds that genuine
fear requires belief. But see Robert Zajonc, “On the Primacy of Affect,” American Psycholo-
gist, xxxix, 2 (1984): 117–23. Also, consider this: someone watches a Bigfoot film, not
believing any of it, and then is scared later by a friend in a Bigfoot suit who jumps out
from behind a tree. Is that not fear? It is possible (and I think actual) that fear forma-
tion is faster than belief formation. Walton’s view excludes this possibility.
me 
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street to a distance beyond where I imagined the skunk spray going,
and then ran across along the route I had imagined. I felt a sense of
relief once I had passed, having felt nervous before.
The skunk representation was a veridical perception that made
me feel nervous in the way that perceptions of animals can. The
skunk-spray representation, however, was an imagining. Crucially, this
imagining was visual and was integrated into my visual field (Claims 4
and 5). Furthermore, I constructed my motor imagining—the path
that I would take—in relation to the visually imagined spray; I used
the imagined visualization of the spray to choose a path across the
perceived street. (Had the visualization not been integrated into the
perceptual manifold, I would not have known how much of the street
to cross.) Of course, I would not have imagined the skunk spraying
in the first place if I did not believe that skunks spray (Claims 2 and 3),
so belief in fact was involved in the imagining and ultimately in the
action, but it was causally upstream from the imagining in relation to
the action (Claim 1).
So far this is an example of how imagining is involved in plain ac-
tion. What about pretending? Suppose I had been jogging along and
decided to pretend there was a skunk in my path, even though I had
not seen one. My bodily motions would have been the same; I just
would have been pretending to avoid a skunk instead of seriously
avoiding a skunk.
The crucial point from the cases is this: the structure of representations
that enables me to pretend to avoid the spray of an imaginary skunk is almost
entirely the same as the structure of representations that enables me seriously to
avoid the potential spray of a real skunk. That being said, there are two
mental differences between the pretense and serious skunk avoidances.
First, the veridical perception of the skunk comes with anticipation of
further recalcitrant experience, or experience beyond voluntary con-
trol, such as catching my foot if I ran into what the percept is of; the
imaginary skunk image does not involve anticipation of recalcitrance.28
28 This point could be expanded greatly. The question is: what constitutes the valence
that differentiates imagery from perception, given that the representational format
is the same? In an earlier draft, I said that perception was more “solid” and that it
“obscured” what was behind it. But Dagfinn Føllesdal pointed out (personal communi-
cation) that it is in principle possible to imagine something that obscures what is behind
it. So lacking solidity and not obscuring are contingent features of the imaginary image.
“Anticipation of further recalcitrant experience” gets closer to defining the valence of
veridical perception (see Føllesdal, “Existence, Inexpressibility, and Philosophical
Knowledge,” Grazer Philosophische Studien, lxxiv, 1 (2007): 273–90, who is interpreting
Husserl). But I argue in “What Is a Judgment?” that we need to identify asymmetric rela-
tions between attitude valences to define them; on my view, veridical representations
govern and ground representations with other valences.
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Second, the higher cognitive attitudes that comment on the perceptual
manifold include, in the serious case, a belief that that is a skunk, where
the <that> constituent has its content given by the skunk percept. The
higher cognitive attitudes include, in the pretense case, a belief that that
is an imaginary skunk, where the <that> constituent this time has its con-
tent given by the skunk mental image. (Alternately, we may say that a
propositional imagining comments on the visualization of the skunk,
where “propositional imagining” refers to what the other theorists were
attempting to talk about with their imagination boxes. Although I reject
the other theories, I do believe there are propositional imaginings; a
good example would be the long-standing imaginative attitude that
J. R. R. Tolkein had that elves are immortal, which guided how he wrote
many of the episodes in Lord of the Rings. The propositional imagining
in my pretense would then have the content that is a skunk.)
Claims 1 through 5 apply to the pretense case as to the serious
case. We may add that, insofar as I feel emotional excitement in
the pretense, it is because of connections that visually formatted
representations have to the brain’s emotional centers, as maintained
in Claim 6.
Let us explicate the main thesis of this paper in relation to these six
claims. The Active Imagination Thesis posits a type of imagining that
is a forward model of action in the world. The imagination constructs
this model in relation to objects of perception and in doing so seeks
to satisfy the goals set by higher attitudes, such as beliefs and desires.
In pretend play, two shifts can happen. First, some of the objects in
the perceptual field, in relation to which motor commands are con-
structed, can be imaginary mental images. The sword I duck in make-
believe is the one I visualize in your (actually empty) hand as you
make a slicing motion aimed at my head. Second, the higher attitudes
can comment on the actor/subject, whose motions the forward model
represents, in a way that makes that actor/subject out to be someone
or something else. If I am pretending to be a prince who ducks the
sword, I have a higher imaginative attitude commenting on the sub-
ject of the ducking with the content I [the subject] am a prince. In some
pretense, one of these shifts happens without the other, as when I
pretend in my own character to give a speech to an audience in a room
of actually empty chairs (visualization of new entities without change
of acting subject), or when one is at a fancy high-table lunch and
imagines oneself to be an actor in a Gilbert and Sullivan musical29
(change of subject without additional visualizations).
29 Thanks to Daniel Dennett for this example.
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Let me add one elaboration to extend the theory to pretense in-
volving imitation.
Suppose you see a bird flying through the air and decide to imi-
tate it. You then produce a flapping motion with your arms to mirror
the perceived motion of the bird’s wings and a chirp of your voice
to mirror the bird’s heard chirp. This is imitation, or mimesis, and
humans are uniquely good at it.30 In pretense, what is imitated need
not be directly before one in the external world. One can imitate a
mental image or other imagined content. What happens, for exam-
ple, in a game of charades? You read a card that says “flying bird.” A
mental image of a bird flapping its wings pops into your mind. So,
playing the game, you imitate the motion of the bird that is repre-
sented in your visual imagination by flapping your arms. If it pops
into your auditory imagination that the bird chirps, you chirp. In
sum, the visual and auditory mental images in the charades play
the role that the perceptions did when you saw the bird; they give
you something to imitate. It should be no surprise that there is a
parallelism, since imagery plays out on the same cortices as percep-
tion. What is needed to motivate such pretense is the desire to act
out—copy the motions of—whatever is going on in imagination. Let
us call this mimesis-based pretense.
The way mimesis-based pretense meshes with the Active Imagina-
tion Thesis is as follows: in addition to providing objects in relation
to which forward-model imagining constructs actions, mental imagery
can set the structure of motion that the forward model models. There
are thus two different roles for mental imagery in action and pretense;
let us call the first the object-acted-upon role and the second the object-
imitated role. Our two paradigm examples of these roles are the swing-
ing sword and the flying bird. The visualized swinging sword gives, via
perceptual imagining, a spatially represented object for the forward
model to make my body avoid; the visualized flying bird gives a
motion for the forward model to imitate.
The Evidence for Neuropsychological Plausibility
My account is built out of a number of components, many of which
are supported by research programs in cognitive neuroscience. What
follows is a small sample of important results.
30 The capacity for (precise) imitation is distinctive of our species. See Joseph Henrich’s
and Richard McElreath’s “The Evolution of Cultural Evolution,” Evolutionary Anthropology,
xii, 3 (2003): 123–35, and Michael Tomasello’s The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition
(Cambridge: Harvard, 1999), but also see chapter four of Aristotle’s Poetics.
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Fact 1: Mental imagery exists.
Fact 2: Mental imagery is processed largely in the same regions of the
brain as perception.
Fact 3: Forward models are implicated in the planning and performance
of motor actions.
Fact 4: The brain’s perceptual regions have a fairly direct role in activat-
ing emotional centers and processes.
Kosslyn’s research program establishes Fact 1.31 The way to inter-
pret Fact 1 is to say that imaginatively generated mental representa-
tions exist that (1) are structured like perception and (2) depict
spatial properties in analogue fashion. This is not a “pictures in the
mind” view; rather, however the brain encodes percepts, it can encode
imaginary representations in like manner.
The evidence for Fact 2 is intertwined with the evidence for Fact 1.
Kosslyn et al. show how visual area 17 is activated both in perception
and in imaginative imagery. The same sorts of contents, whether per-
ceived or imagined, yield similar activation patterns. Other results
point in the same direction. Kathleen O’Craven and Nancy Kanwisher
show how the fusiform face area (FFA) is activated both by seeing
faces and by imagining them. Jonathan Winawer, Alexander Huk,
and Lera Boroditsky showed subjects pictures that had implied motion
(for example, a runner in mid-stride) and found that these images
activate the same direction-selective circuits that process real motion;
I take this to show that imagining motion on seeing the photograph is
processed similarly to seeing motion. These few studies are the tip of
an iceberg supporting Fact 2.32
Fact 3 follows primarily from studies that assume the existence of
a forward model in the central nervous system and use that assump-
tion to derive accurate predictions about motion. For example, the
assumption that the brain uses forward models to plan action can
yield accurate estimates about the extent to which a subject will over-
or underestimate an arm motion toward an object, when resistance
or help is applied to the arm.33
31 Summarized in Kosslyn, William Thompson, and Giorgio Ganis, The Case for Mental
Imagery (New York: Oxford, 2006).
32 References: Kosslyn et al., “The Role of Area 17 in Visual Imagery: Convergent
Evidence from PET and rTMS,” Science, cclxxxiv, 5411 (April 1999): 167–70;
J. Winawer, A. Huk, and L. Boroditsky, “A Motion Aftereffect from Still Photographs
Depicting Motion,” Psychological Science, xix, 3 (March 2008): 276–83; K. O’Craven
and N. Kanwisher, “Mental Imagery of Faces and Places Activates Corresponding
Stimulus-Specific Brain Regions,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, xii, 6 (November 2000):
1013–23.
33 See D. M. Wolpert, Z. Ghahramani, and M. I. Jordan, “An Internal Model of
Sensorimotor Integration,” Science, cclxix, 5232 (September 1995): 1880–82; Wolpert,
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Fact 4 also has extensive evidence. A representative research pro-
gram is that of Joseph LeDoux, who finds there is a “low” and a
“high” road from sensory cortices to the amygdalae, the brain’s fear
centers. The low road is fast and sloppy and is responsible for fear re-
sponses to things that only loosely resemble dangerous objects; LeDoux
posits sub-doxastic appraisals along the low road—representations
of particular dangerous types, like snakes—that trigger fear re-
sponses. The “high” road is slower but has more precision and
nuance. The high road can extinguish fear responses to stimuli that
are not actually dangerous. In a way, Fact 4 should be obvious prior
to any evidence from neuroscience; we have always known that sights
and sounds stimulate emotion. But we are becoming much clearer on
how that happens.34
Facts 1, 2, and 4 yield my view of imagining and emotion: the per-
ceptual aspect of imagining is central to emotional stimulation, activat-
ing emotional responses by the same pathways as perception itself.35
We need no i-desires to explain the emotions that fiction incites.
Finally, there are two empirical claims to which my account com-
mits me that, as far as I know, have not been rigorously tested. First,
I hold that, in pretense, perceptual imagining is integrated with per-
ception. That may seem obvious to phenomenological reflection,
but we should demand corroboration. This claim, however, will be
hard to test by the usual means; much evidence for the brain activa-
tion of imagery comes from fMRI studies, but the sort of pretend play
I discuss, which incorporates both perceived and imagined objects
integrated in the same manifold, can hardly be done well in the scan-
ner.36 Second, I say that a mental image in the object-imitated role can
R. C. Miall, and M. Kawato, “Internal Models in the Cerebellum,” Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, ii, 9 (September 1998): 338–47; and (for a broad extension of the research pro-
gram) R. Grush, “The Emulation Theory of Representation: Motor Control, Imagery,
and Perception,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, xxvii, 3 ( June 2004): 377–442.
34 LeDoux summarizes this research in The Emotional Brain (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1996).
35 This is essentially the view that Timothy Schroeder and Carl Matheson advocate
in “Imagination and Emotion,” in Nichols, ed., The Architecture of Imagination (New York:
Oxford, 2006), pp. 19–40.
36 One of the very first studies on mental imagery bears on this integration claim.
C. W. Perky had subjects look at a screen with instructions telling them to imagine,
say, a banana; then, unbeknownst to the subjects, a banana would be projected faintly
on the screen. Perky found that subjects took the real banana image for a mental
image. See “An Experimental Study of Imagination,” American Journal of Psychology ,
xxi, 3 ( July 1910): 422–52. This result, if legitimate, supports my view that mental
images can integrate with the visual field; otherwise subjects would never confuse a
percept with an image.
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have influence on the construction of the forward model of bodily
motion. Research into mirror neurons may support this view in some
way, but as far as I can tell, it is still too early to say.37 Nevertheless, we
know that imitation of perceived actions happens somehow; my view
is that pretense proceeds by replicating much the same process,
whatever it is, with the difference being that a mental image of the
object imitated substitutes for a perception.
Application to Semi-Pretense and Layering
As she sits next to Leroy at the pool, the mental image of a judge
pops into Jennifer’s mind, and this image takes the object-imitated role
in the construction of action. Once the image has taken this role, it is
implicated in forming the forward model of how she might behave. If
that behavior is supported by her other attitudes—say, a desire to joke
around with Leroy—she will act out the judge-imitating forward
model, delivering verdicts like “Ten!”
Now, there can be various causes of the judge image that occurs to
her. If an explicit desire or intention to pretend causes the image, the
process that follows will be full pretense. Many actions occur in imagery,
however, with other causal sources (besides desire or intention) and take
the object-imitated role nonetheless. That is the crucial point. Images
can occur due to habit, obsession, resemblance of a current situation
to a past one, misunderstanding, and so on. When the source of the
mental image in the object-imitated role is something other than a desire
or intention to pretend, what results may be semi-pretense, in which the
image still affects the forward model of action in subtle (unintended)
ways. Thus, semi-pretense can be defined as follows:
Action A by subject S is semi-pretense if, and only if:
(i) S has a mental image M in the object-imitated role that influences the
action recipe38 or forward model that eventuates in A, and
(ii) S lacks the desire or intention to pretend to do the action represented
in M.
On this view, semi-pretense is what happens when the images that swim
in our minds infect our actions without our explicitly intending them to
37 For the case for pervasive involvement of mirror neurons, see Alvin Goldman’s
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading (New York:
Oxford, 2006).
38 By “action recipe” I just mean a structure of behaviors that add up to a larger action,
for example, <push ON, push OPEN, open DVD case, insert DVD>. Action recipes are a
level more abstract than forward models, since forward models code specific bodily
motions, while, for example, the action recipe just mentioned could be executed whether
the ON button is on the right or left, that is, with different bodily motions.
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do so. Such actions may even become habit. If they do, there may even-
tually cease to be any sense in calling them “pretense,” since the mental
images causing them have long since vanished. In that case, the forward
model of action lives on through habit, despite the death of the image
that gave it birth. The ghost of the object imitated pervades the bodily
motions of the habitual actor long into the future, without any conscious
knowledge on his part.
Let us turn to pretense layering. I have emphasized throughout
that beliefs comment on the contents of perceptual imagining and
motor imagining. Whenever a given action is constructed in spa-
tially rich perceptual and motor imagining, beliefs (or propositional
imaginings) comment on the story to which that pretense action
belongs. To return to our analogy with geometry, marginal com-
ments can track whether a given diagram belongs to the main proof
or sub-proof. Thus, when James Dean says, “Should we rent or are
we in a buying mood, dear?” the most immediate cause of this action
is a forward-model imagining that is influenced by a mental image
of an adult in the object-imitated role; what makes that action
second-layer pretense, as opposed to first-layer, is the set of beliefs
and higher imaginings that places the image and action in a larger
story. Those attitudes then further cause and guide what spatially
rich imaginings come next in Dean’s mind, leading him up the stairs
with Judy.
iv. conclusion: a structure to guide us
Imagination is, ultimately, the production of a structure that can
guide action. That action must occur in the world we take in via a
flood of information through the senses. Thus, there must be forms
of imagining that integrate seamlessly with our perceptual repre-
sentations, if imagination is to be of any use at all. That is why, I
believe, imagining plays out on the sensory cortices of the brain;
that is also why propositional imagining is not sufficient to explain
the variation and complexity of pretense behavior—and other be-
havior. In the Nichols and Stich theory, there are three boxes be-
tween imaginings and the “Action Control systems” and two boxes
between imaginings and perceptual processes, which (to judge from
the arrows) do not interact with imagining much at all. My theory
could not be more different. The forms of imagining I posit integrate
with perception and guide action.
But let me emphasize once again: this does not mean that beliefs
and desires have nothing to do with choice of either pretense or
serious action. Rather the beliefs, desires, and other attitudes that
comment on and constrain imaginative representations are crucial
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to determining whether and when imagined actions are initiated.
But the spatial resolution of imagination makes it suitable to produc-
ing structures that can dictate the geometric unfolding of bodily
motion in the world. Imagination is where the action is.
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